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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Energy  resources  are  transported  long  distances  and  create  powerful  interlinkages  between  countries.
Energy  thus  contributes  to  the  globalization  of  the  world,  but  has  received  little  attention  in  the glob-
alization  literature.  This  article  hypothesizes  that energy  globalization  is growing  and  accelerating.  The
hypothesis  is tested  by  developing  an  index  to  measure  changes  in  the  extent  of energy  globalizationeywords:
nergy
lobalization
easurement
ethodology
during the  20-year  period  from  1992  to 2011.  The  following  sub-indicators  are  included  in the  index:
number  of  energy  trade  relationships,  average  distance  of energy  trade  relationships,  and  energy  depen-
dency  of  the  countries  in  the  world.  The  development  of the index  encounters  a number  of  conceptual  and
methodological  challenges  related  to  globalization,  which,  it turns  out, have  not  been  addressed  properly
in  the broader  literature.  Clariﬁcation  of  these  issues  can  help  improve  the analysis  of  globalization.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd. This  is an open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  license. Introduction
During most of human existence, people would go outside their
ouse, tent, or cave; gather some dead branches or chop down a
ree; and that was their source of energy. Only during the past
ew hundred years have growing numbers of people obtained their
nergy from further aﬁeld, and its supply has thus become entan-
led in faraway locations and events. This is particularly true of oil,
ut also of all the other energy types that can be moved across bor-
ers: coal, electricity, natural gas, and nuclear fuel—all of which this
rticle deals with. These energy interlinkages are a form of global-
zation that contributes to increasing interaction between different
arts of the world.
The Middle-East oil crises of 1973 and 1979 and the
ussian–Ukrainian gas crises of 2006, 2009, and 2014 illustrate the
ependency aspect of energy globalization [29,p. 13]. Had import-
ng countries such as the United States and Ukraine been energy
elf-sufﬁcient, these events could not have occurred. On the other
and, energy resources are unevenly distributed and if all coun-
ries in the world were to make do with their own resources, there
ould be even more energy poverty in the world than there is now.
urrently, 1.4 billion people are not connected to an electricity grid,
nd 2.7 billion people rely on traditional biomass for cooking, with
∗ Corresponding author at: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, PB 8159
ep., 0033 Oslo, Norway.
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1 Spokesperson for prixindex.net political risk forecasting for world oil markets.
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214-6296/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
the resulting fumes causing large-scale pulmonary health problems
[34,p. 1] [37,p. 153].
The globalization literature covers a large number of sub-topics,
including economics (e.g., [20,26,28]), politics (e.g., [39,6,7]), cul-
ture (e.g., [8,57,23]), social relations (e.g., [40]), technology (e.g.,
[41,25,74]) and migration (e.g., [63]). However, energy is a missing
link. A seminal analysis of over 4000 articles about energy iden-
tiﬁed 15 main energy topics and 71 sub-topics, but globalization
is not among them ([60,p. 6], cf. [61]). This is also conﬁrmed by a
series of searches in the Thomson Reuters Web  of Science database
[64]. As shown in Table 1, there are many publications on energy
and many on globalization, but hardly any touch on both energy
and globalization. None are a systematic analysis of energy glob-
alization per se. Many concern irrelevant topics, such as nutrition
or dental care, while others are on relevant but narrower topics:
the consequences of globalization for the energy sector in a single
energy-rich country or region (e.g., [2,55,65]); energy challenges at
the global level, such as climate change or energy security (e.g.,
[10]); or the internationalization of markets for speciﬁc energy
types (e.g., [4,5]). Only a single publication is about the process
of globalization in and through the energy sector itself [30], but
it is actually largely devoted to energy security, US interests and
the rise of Asia. A search including related terms such as “transna-
tionalism” and “internationalism”, which were used more before
“globalization” came into widespread use in the 1970s, does not
give different results. Never has a systematic analysis providing an
overall assessment or measurement of energy globalization at the
global level been published.
In addition, an examination of the six main composite indices
of globalization ﬁnds that none include an energy sub-indicator.
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Table  1
Bibliographical database search; titles, abstracts and keywords; published between
1900 and 2015; limited to social sciences [64].
Search terms Hits
“Energy” 81 332
“Globali*ation” 27 957
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Fig. 1. The growing number of LNG terminals in Europe.“Energy and globalization” 251
“Energy globali*ation” 0
his includes the Kearney Foreign Policy Globalization Index [70],
he Konjunkturforschungsstelle (KOF) Index [56,15,16], the Cen-
re for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR) Index
71,36,49], the Maastricht Globalization Index (MGI) [17,24], the
ew Globalization Index [76], and the G-Index [75]. For an overview
f these indices, see [59].
As Yatchew [68,p. 74] formulated it, “the pursuit of energy is a
undamental driver of human history” (cf. [62,p. 65]). Energy under-
ins the economic growth and military might of countries [51,p. 1].
t is seen as a potential driver of international conﬂict—over politi-
al inﬂuence in major oil-producing countries, military control over
ransport choke points and rights to continental shelves [48,p. 1].
il companies are some of the world’s largest multinational corpo-
ations. The largest international oil companies typically operate
n scores of countries across all continents, with investments of
ens of billions of USD in several of them and tens of thousands of
mployees spread around the world (e.g., [22,9]).
Energy must therefore be central to globalization, and its
bsence from the globalization literature is an important omission.
t is difﬁcult to say why there has been so little attention to energy
n the literature. Perhaps many of those who have studied global-
zation see energy as a set of simple commodities and overlook its
rucial role in the functioning of societies; and perhaps many those
ho have engaged in the study of energy, many of whom have
 preference for hard data, have associated the globalization topic
ith authors such as Rosenau [58] and see it as wishy-washy. In any
ase, the purpose of this article is to contribute to ﬁlling the gap at
hree levels: conceptually, empirically, and methodologically.
. Hypothesis
One of the few works that touches on the topic of energy global-
zation is Keohane and Nye’s [38] book Power and Interdependence.
he backdrop and inspiration for their book was the oil crisis of
973, which was precipitated by increasing imports of oil from
he Persian Gulf to Western countries, where private car owner-
hip was on the rise. Since Keohane and Nye wrote their book,
here have been many new developments that may  have accel-
rated energy globalization. One example is the building of the
hina–Turkmenistan gas pipeline. By connecting Turkmenistan to
hina’s domestic grid, this pipeline makes it possible to transport
as some 7000 km from Turkmenistan to Shanghai [3]. Turk-
enistan is already connected 4000 km westwards via Russia and
kraine and the European pipeline grid, which in turn extends from
inland in the north to central Algeria in the south. In parallel devel-
pments, the EU is working to dissolve old national monopolies and
o liberalize, and thus integrate, the European gas market; inter-
onnectors have been created between the various national grids
f European countries [54,p. 124], and regasiﬁcation terminals have
een constructed along the European seaboard to receive liqueﬁed
atural gas (LNG) by ship from other parts of the world (see Fig. 1).
uch developments create new connections between the markets
or natural gas in different parts of the world.
A more comprehensive overview of developments that point
oward a hypothesis of rising globalization is provided in Table 2.
aking into account the developments listed in Table 2, I hypoth-esize that energy globalization is growing and accelerating. This
hypothesis is echoed by Goldthau and Boersma [29,p. 13] as well
as Harris [30,p. 272]: “Today. . . energy market globalization is
unprecedented in its pace, range, and depth.” One  way of assessing
the hypothesis is to create an index of energy globalization to mea-
sure ﬂows of energy between different countries and track changes
in these ﬂows. The rest of this article is about how such an index can
be composed and the interesting conceptual and methodological
questions that it gives rise to.
3. Deﬁning globalization
There are many deﬁnitions of globalization. In 2006, Al Rod-
han [1] gathered 114 deﬁnitions, and more have been added to
the literature in subsequent years. I have selected four texts as
the starting point for an energy-speciﬁc deﬁnition of globalization.
The texts were selected because they emphasize interconnected-
ness, interdependence, and interrelations, and it makes sense to
put such aspects at the center of an analysis of how energy creates
interlinkages around the world. In addition, they represent the full
breadth of the topics covered by the globalization literature, includ-
ing criminality, culture, economy, ﬁnance, geography, politics, and
spirituality. The four texts deﬁne globalization as:
“. . .the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide
interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life,
from the cultural to the criminal, the ﬁnancial to the spiritual. . .”
[73,p. 2].
“. . .the growing economic interdependence of countries world-
wide through the increasing volume and variety of cross-border
transactions in goods and services and of international capital
ﬂows. . .”  [74,p. 45].
“. . .the intensiﬁcation of economic, political, social and cultural
relations across borders. . .”  [31,p. 1].
“. . .the intensiﬁcation of worldwide social relations which link
distant localities in such a way  that local happenings are shaped
by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. . .”  [27,p.
64].
Drawing on these four general deﬁnitions of globalization,
energy globalization can be deﬁned as the growing interconnect-
edness of the world’s energy supplies through the movement of
growing volumes of energy over greater distances across interna-
tional borders. This deﬁnition will be operationalized through the
selection of sub-indicators for the energy globalization index in the
following sections of the article.
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Table 2
Some factors contributing to energy globalization, 1995–2015.
Development Consequences
Growing energy consumption in emerging economies > Makes the global consumer picture more complex and multipolar, less centered on the West
Emerging/expanding petroleum-producing regions > Makes the global production picture more complex and multipolar (e.g., the Arctic, East Africa,
East Mediterranean, the Russian Far East and Brazilian deep water)
New  natural gas pipelines and interconnectors > Expands and connects the regions within which natural gas is traded
Unconventional oil and gas technology > Increases the number of locations where oil and gas are extracted
Increased LNG capacity > Makes it possible to trade gas around the world rather than only within national and regional
markets connected by pipelines
Liberalization of trade in energy-intensive commodities > Liberalization of trade in energy-intensive commodities such as steel, aluminum and cement
leads to greater indirect competition between coal, hydropower and natural gas markets
around the world
Expanding regional energy markets > The areas within which electricity, coal and ﬁrewood are traded have expanded
geographically, promoted by free-trade agreements, especially in the EU
Global  climate policy > Many actors aim to create a uniﬁed global framework for all energy use, promoting some
energy types and discouraging others
Growing number of electric machines > Electric cars, bicycles, garden tools, household appliances, etc., use electricity that can be
generated by many different primary energy sources (nuclear power, natural gas, coal, wind
power, solar energy), thus bringing these energy sources into competition with each other via
the  expanding electricity market
Growing number of NGVs > Natural gas vehicles (NGVs) lead to increased competition between oil and natural gas in the
transport sector, thus connecting oil and natural markets with different geographical coverage
atter
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. Selection of sub-indicators for energy globalization index
For the construction of the index, it is important to ﬁnd indi-
ators that: say something meaningful about international energy
elations; are different from each other; and for which data are
vailable. The three sub-indicators selected according to these
riteria are number of energy trade relationships in the world; dis-
ance of energy trade relationships; and energy dependency (see
able 3).
An energy globalization index should cover the main energy
ypes that can be transported across borders: coal, electricity, nat-
ral gas, nuclear fuel, and oil and oil products. The ideal would
e to use data on the actual physical ﬂows of these energy types,
easured in barrels of oil equivalent (boe) or British thermal units
Btu). However, because such data either do not exist or are very
ifﬁcult to access, I instead use ﬁnancial trade data as a proxy. Eco-
omic data are thus used as the basis for the analysis because they
re available. However, rather than economics per se, the analy-
is is about the energy connections between different locations in
he world (geography) and between states (political science). In the
ords of Pasqualetti and Brown [19,p. 122], “if energy and society
re parts of the same cloth, geography is the thread that ties them
ogether.”
As there is no perfect way of measuring distance for the purposes
f analyzing globalization, the number of kilometers between coun-
ries that trade energy is used as a proxy. It would not be possible
o use the number of kilometers between the exact locations that
nergy is sent from and to because such data are not gathered. And
ven if the data did exist, they would not give an entirely accurate
icture since energy can travel great distances within a large coun-
able 3
ub-indicators selected as proxies for energy globalization in index.
Sub-indicator Rationale 
A. Number of energy trade relationships in the world The more 
more diffe
B. Distance in kilometers between countries that trade energy The furthe
factors it c
costs, stor
C. Energy dependency (ratio of net energy imports or exports
to domestic energy consumption)
The more 
energy, thns of energy use across national borders through attitudes toward nuclear
able energy, diesel, sports utility vehicles, electric cars, windmills, etc.
try such as the USA without much change in context or chance of
events along the way; or travel only a few kilometers across a bor-
der between two very different locations, for example Norway and
Russia. There is also an inaccuracy in using distance between coun-
tries while ignoring movement of energy within countries, since
some countries such as India or Kenya have far greater internal
variation than others. However, since the data are organized by
country that is a weakness that we have to live with.
The hypothetical example in Fig. 2 illustrates how the three
sub-indicators jointly measure the level of globalization. Country
A exports 2 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil to country B. Then,
country B becomes poorer while country C becomes richer, so that
exports from country A to country B are reduced to 1 million bpd per
day and, at the same time, country C starts importing 1 million bpd.
The sum of energy dependency in the three countries combined is
the same, and the same amount of oil crosses international borders
the same number of times; nonetheless, globalization has increased
because the number of energy trade relationships has grown.
In addition to the three sub-indicators selected, I also considered
including the percentage of energy investment that comes from
abroad. Especially in the petroleum sector, and increasingly also
in the nuclear and electricity sectors, large companies play impor-
tant trans-border roles, and this indicator would have brought out
the role that these companies play in the energy sector. For most
countries, however, it is not possible to ﬁnd country-level data that
distinguish foreign direct investment (FDI) in the energy sector
from other FDI. Furthermore, although relevant, this is not the most
important potential sub-indicator on energy globalization. For the
purposes of this article, the ﬂow of energy itself is more important
than the ﬂow of investment in energy.
Source
other countries a country trades energy with, the
rent places in the world it is interconnected with
Comtrade via WITS [66]
r energy travels, the more places, events, and
an interact with along the way: wars, shipping
ms, pirates, etc. [44,p. 106]
Comtrade via WITS [66]
dependent a country is on imported or exported
e more connected it is with the world
IEA via World Bank [67]
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. Temporal cut-off points
For all three selected sub-indicators, data are available from the
arly 1960s, and my  initial intention was to extend the index back to
960 in order to provide a long-term perspective on energy global-
zation. However, weaknesses in the data militate against this. The
urther back in time one goes, the more countries for which data
re missing. One might limit the index to those countries that have
eported for all years, but this would lead to bias, as the industri-
lized countries of the OECD are heavily overrepresented among
his group. One of the most interesting aspects of the development
f the global energy sector is the rise of emerging economies as
onsumers and importers of energy, and they would be left out
ecause they had limited capacity for recording statistics during
he ﬁrst years of the dataset.
In addition, the further back in time one goes, the more misre-
orting there is among the countries that did report. According to
elchior [46,p. 5], this leads to an error of up to 12% in terms of trade
olume and 35% in terms of number of trade relationships in some
ears. Some countries entirely failed to report during some years of
he ﬁrst decades of the data. For example, Saudi Arabia, one of the
orld’s largest energy exporters, did not report between 1969 and
974. Such lacunae make the data unreliable for the 1960s, 1970s
nd 1980s.
Further challenges are posed by the dissolution of Czechoslo-
akia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as well as the uniﬁcation
f East and West Germany. If a time series spanning those events
ere used, it could have made it difﬁcult to know how to inter-
ret the globalization data. With the breakup of states, integrated
nergy systems for single countries are disrupted by the newly
rected international borders of multiple successor states. In the
ase of the Soviet Union, there were as many as 15 successor states.
his leads to energy crossing more international borders, a higher
ount of international energy trade relationships and an increase
n energy dependency. For example, the same amount of oil trans-
orted annually from the same ﬁeld in Russia through the same
ipeline to the same reﬁnery in Belarus before and after the dis-
olution of the Soviet Union would be registered by the index as
ncreased globalization. The question is whether that would be cor-
ect. One might argue that it is correct because globalization is not
nly about physical distance but also about what might be thought
f as political distance. The dissolution of the USSR led to a more
omplex world with a larger number of distinct political units, and
hus, the total amount of globalization increased.
The growing integration between the EU member states raises
he opposite question: although the countries interact across their
orders with increasing ease, they are also less separate than before.
oes the world become less globalized due to EU integration? One
ould emphasize that the EU is not a country but still many separate
overeign states, and therefore, the greater integration between
hem brought about by the EU should correctly be counted as
ncreased globalization. But what if the EU were to be transformed
nto a fully integrated state—should its contribution to globaliza-changes in sub-indicators.
tion then suddenly be counted as negative? Or  to make the problem
starker, what if the whole world became fully integrated under
a UN government? Would that make the world less globalized?
Intuitively one might argue the contrary, that it would be a highly
globalized world.
If one juxtaposes state disintegration and integration, it is dif-
ﬁcult to make the logics add up. If the dissolution of the Soviet
Union meant more globalization according to the logic of politi-
cal distance, then according to the same logic the integration of
states in the EU or other regional organizations should mean less
globalization. This paradox may  be caused by an underlying con-
tradiction. On the one hand, states are used as proxies for different
locations on the planet, and thus, sometimes the use of states as
the unit of analysis can lead to misleading results insofar as one is
actually interested in locations and the distances between them. On
the other hand, state boundaries and the separateness of sovereign
states as independent political entities are also a relevant factor in
their own right, so they also have to play a role in the analysis.
This contradiction and the other problems with data described
above are not easily resolved, but they are partly obviated by start-
ing the time series in 1992. By the end of that year, the Soviet Union
had dissolved, Germany had been reunited, and Czechoslovakia and
most of Yugoslavia had dissolved. With the dataset starting in 1992,
it is still possible to capture the many interesting developments
of the 1990s and 2000s that might contribute to globalization,
such as longer pipelines, intensiﬁed efforts at market liberalization,
the growth in LNG and the rise of the BRICs and other emerging
economies.
After the data were truncated in 1992, there were still some
countries for which data were incomplete. Most of these were
microstates, which were simply removed from the dataset. This
left a dataset of 197 countries, covering the vast majority of the
planet’s economy, population, and surface. However, data were
still lacking for a few major countries for occasional years after
1992—for example, Russia, which happens to be the world’s largest
energy exporter [53,p. 6]. For these countries, it was  assumed that
no change occurred in the years with missing data.
The next three sections discuss the sub-indicators separately.
Each of them makes a contribution to the overall picture of energy
globalization and raises different methodological issues.
6. Sub-indicator A: number of energy trade relationships
If a country engages in both the sale and purchase of energy
with another country, should this be counted as one or two energy
trade relationships? For example, if one country exports crude oil
to another country and re-imports reﬁned gasoline from the same
country, the two  countries are more dependent on each other than
if the country had only exported crude oil and not imported any-
thing in return. I therefore count a unidirectional relationship as
one relationship and a two-way relationship as two.
For each unidirectional relationship, the data are registered
twice in the statistics, by the exporting country and by the import-
126 I. Overland / Energy Research & Soci
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age of the exporting and importing country, which depends on the
other trade relationships of the speciﬁc country in question. Thus,Fig. 3. Sum of number of energy trade partners of 197 countries.
ng country. Often, these data diverge (cf. [46,pp. 4–5],[33]). Which
f these should one use? Because importing states have an interest
n levying tariffs and in stopping illegal goods, I assume that their
tatistics are more reliable and I therefore use them. Thus, if two
ountries only trade one way, it is registered as one importing rela-
ionship; if they trade both ways it is registered as two importing
elationships.
I also decided to count each trade partnership as one relation-
hip regardless of how many energy types the two countries traded.
his was partly because it was easier to do with the data down-
oaded from the WITS website and partly because in a globalization
erspective it is more important how many other countries a coun-
ry has energy trade relationships with, than the speciﬁc types of
nergy traded.
Having decided on these basic questions about how to interpret
he statistics, I turned to a more complex issue. My initial plan was
o simply count the change in the number of energy trade part-
ers over time: the greater the number of trade partners, the more
lobalized the world. However, this raises some complex questions,
hich can be exempliﬁed with the following hypothetical cases. If
 country’s population is 10 million and it has 100 energy trade
elationships, but then the population grows to 11 million and the
umber of energy trade relationships grows to 110, is the coun-
ry more globalized? As a state, it has more energy trade partners,
ut per capita, the number is the same. Most people I presented
his example to concluded that the index should simply measure
lobalization relative to countries, not the size of their population.
owever, this problem can also be conceptualized with a differ-
nt example. If country x has a population of 5 million and has 10
nergy trade relationships, while country y has a population of 1
illion and has 12 energy relationships, which is more globalized?
ere, one might be tempted to conclude that country x is more
lobalized than country y, but then the logic is inconsistent with
hat in the previous example.
If the aim were to compare the degree of energy globalization
f different countries, this could be an intractable problem. How-
ver, as this study is instead aimed at tracking change in the world
s a whole over time, the question is slightly less problematic and
oils down to a choice between whether one wants to measure
lobalization per capita (or per USD of income); or globalization of
he world as whole without regard to the number of people who
nhabit it or the size of the world economy. A control question here
ould be whether one considers more globalized a world inhab-
ted by one million people and with few international linkages less
lobalized and a world inhabited by one billion people and with
any international linkages. My  answer to that question is “yes”,
nd I therefore conclude that for the purpose of this index, I am
nterested in the globalization of the world as whole rather than
er capita.al Science 14 (2016) 122–130
The development of sub-indicator A from 1992 to 2011 is illus-
trated in Fig. 3. It is worth noting that at its peak in 2010, it shows
that there were over 11 000 energy trade relationships, which also
says something about the large size of the dataset used for this
analysis.
7. Sub-indicator B: average distance of energy trade
relationships
The ideal sub-indicator for the index would have been the
energy equivalent of the aviation industry’s passenger miles, i.e.,
the number of miles over which each unit of energy travels—what
one might call “energy miles”. This would, however, have depended
on having access to data on physical volumes of energy ﬂows.
Because such data either do not exist or are too difﬁcult to get
hold of and it is necessary to use trade data in USD  instead, energy
miles is not an option. If one multiplied the distances that energy
is moved by the available trade data, variations in energy prices
between different locations and over time would seriously distort
the calculations. The prices of natural gas, coal and electricity are
particularly prone to geographical variation, while the price of oil
is particularly prone to temporal variation—but the prices of all
energy sources vary in both dimensions. This means that changes in
the trade statistics do not necessarily reﬂect an increase or decrease
in the amount of energy traded. In an energy trade relationship,
energy ﬂows in one direction and money ﬂows in the other direc-
tion. Although the two  are connected, changes in the ﬂow in one
direction are not necessarily reﬂected proportionately in the ﬂow
in the other direction. In particular, the price elasticity of demand
for oil is considered to be low [11,13,47], but inelasticities exist in
many parts of the energy sector. My  interest is in the global energy
interlinkages as such, rather than the money that is paid for them;
therefore, it is important to make sure that the ﬁnancial trade data
are only used as a proxy and do not become the objective of the
analysis in their own  right.
An alternative might be to calculate an energy miles indicator
for only the subset of countries for which data on the actual phys-
ical volumes of energy traded are available, but how would one
then select a representative group of countries? Those countries
with most complete datasets will again be the most industrial-
ized countries, and then one would again miss out on much of the
energy globalization driven by emerging powers such as China and
India and even more so on the many smaller countries with rapidly
growing economies but a history of weak statistics.
After much experimentation, I concluded that the solution to
this problem is to instead estimate the average distance over which
each country trades in each year, weighted by the ﬁnancial value
of each trade relationship of that country. Although this approach
remains vulnerable to variations in energy prices, it is less prob-
lematic than the initial concept of energy miles, as the ﬁnancial
values are now only used to select the average distance over which
individual countries trade and within one year at a time. To obtain
the global sum for a year, I add up all of the country averages in the
world for that year.
When calculating the average distance of energy trade relation-
ships, I have again wondered whether it is correct to count each
trade relationship twice, once for the exporter and once for the
importer. I decided that it is appropriate to do so because I want
to know the average distance of trade relationships for each coun-
try in the world, and for that, I need to use all of its relationships
because each trade relationship has a different effect on the aver-the distances were calculated in a different way  from the number of
trade relationships, where each bilateral relationship was counted
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nly once, from the side of the importing country. The evolution of
ub-indicator B from 1992 to 2011 is illustrated in Fig. 4.
. Sub-indicator C: energy dependency
This last sub-indicator puts the other two in context and reﬂects
he saliency of energy globalization. A country engages in a certain
umber of energy trade relationships over a certain distance, and
he country’s energy dependency says something about the impor-
ance of the other two sub-indicators to that country. A country
ay  trade energy with many remote countries, but if those rela-
ionships play a small role in the country’s own energy supply, the
ountry can be considered less globalized than if they play a large
ole.
As with the other sub-indicators, the data on energy depen-
ency give rise to some methodological issues. First, they do not
istinguish between energy import dependency and energy export
ependency. Although exporting countries have tried to argue that
he two are the same concern, or at least equally important con-
erns, there are clearly important differences between them [72,pp.
40,541],[43,p. 32],[69]. Whereas security of supply relates specif-
cally to basic human energy needs—such as heating buildings,
ooking food and the continued functioning of the state—security
f demand is a general economic concern similar to the concerns
f any country that makes money from exporting something. For
xample, if South Korea loses access to the market for mobile
hones and Russia loses access to the market for natural gas, these
wo events are comparable. However, if Ukraine loses access to the
mported gas that it depends on in the middle of winter, this is
ot only an economic problem but also a more direct and phys-
cal (though not necessarily irresolvable) threat to the Ukrainian
opulation’s survival.
While fully recognizing this difference between security of sup-
ly and security of demand, this article is not about energy security
er se or about the consequences of energy globalization, but about
nergy globalization in its own right. For the purposes of this article,
xports and imports are therefore considered equivalent in terms
f representing connections with other parts of the world.
The second methodological issue related to this sub-indicator
s that the ratio of net energy imports or exports to domestic con-
umption is only a partial indicator of dependency. For example,
magine a country that consumes 10 000 bpd of oil, and 100% of it is
mported. The country gets richer and starts consuming 20 000 bpd,
till 100% from imports. In this case, the ratio of energy imports to
omestic consumption is stable at 100% and the sub-indicator reg-
sters no change, but in fact, the dependency has increased. This is a
ossible weakness of this sub-indicator, but it is also worth noting
gain that the purpose of the index is to measure globalization and
ot energy security and that this sub-indicator does not stand alone
ut is combined with two others that cover other aspects of glob-19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Fig. 5. Average energy dependency of 197 countries.
alization. The development of sub-indicator C from 1992 to 2011 is
illustrated in Fig. 5. Interestingly, and in contrast to the steady rise
of the two other sub-indicators, this one declines.
9. Combining the sub-indicators
The next step is to combine the three sub-indicators into one
index. Because the sub-indicators are different types of values, they
cannot simply be added up (cf. [42,p. 507]). One sub-indicator is
measured in 1000s of kilometers, one in 10s of trade partners, and
one as a percentage of energy dependency. In addition, energy
dependency for most countries is net import dependency rang-
ing 0–100, but for a substantial minority of countries, it is net
export dependency, which can range from zero to several hundred
percent. In order to overcome these differences and make the sub-
indicators compatible with each other, I took the natural logarithm
of the sub-indicator values. That way, each sub-indicator becomes
a normalized percentage-change from the base year.
When the logged sub-indicators are ﬁnally combined into the
index, another issue is encountered, namely whether to take into
account the difference in size of countries. For example, should
the globalization of Lichtenstein count as much as that of China
or the United States? If the countries are not weighted, a change in
Lichtenstein would have equal weight as a change in China or the
United States. Since Lichtenstein is a very small part of the world,
that would give a distorted view of what is going on in the world.
I therefore weighted the contribution of each country to the global
index by its share of the world’s GDP in that year. Thus, the formula
for the ﬁnal index is as follows:
Indext = 
(
lnagt + lnbgt + lncgt
)
× GDPgt
GDPgt
where a is the global sum of the average of the distances of the
energy trade relationships of each country, weighted by the ﬁnan-
cial value of each trade relationship; b is the sum of the number of
energy trade relationships in the world; and c is the average of the
energy dependency of all of the countries in the world. The ﬁnal
composite energy globalization index is graphed in Fig. 6.
10. Energy globalization counter-trends
Fig. 6 shows that the index does rise over time, in accordance
with the hypothesis at the beginning of this article. However, it is
not accelerating as hypothesized. Furthermore, the decline in the
index in 1998, 2001, 2004, 2008, and 2009 shows that energy glob-
alization can also go up and down and may  not always increase
over time, further weakening the hypothesis.
There are several factors that could counteract the trend toward
energy globalization and lead to a falling index. Firstly, rising
domestic consumption in major petroleum-exporting countries
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blig. 7. Energy exports (blue lines) gradually being eaten up by domestic energy co
he  reader is referred to the web  version of this article.)
ource of data: [50].
hanges the balance between how much energy they consume
omestically and how much they export to other countries. The
ising domestic consumption is driven by a combination of three
ain factors: population growth, economic growth, and energy
ubsidies. Fig. 7 exempliﬁes the reduction in net energy exports
ver time for several major energy exporters, all of which are
ajor energy subsidizers. These changes contribute to a lower-
ng of the energy dependency sub-indicator, until the countries
ecome zero net energy exporters. As they gradually become bigger
nergy importers from there on, they contribute more and more to
lobalization again.
Secondly, rising production of unconventional oil and gas have
educed the dependency of the United States on energy imports,
specially after 2004 (see the turnaround in US oil import trends in
ig. 8).
Thirdly, the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, improvements in energy efﬁ-
iency, and increased use of locally produced renewable energy and
oal all contributed to reducing European and US dependency on
mports.1. Conclusions
At the beginning of this article, it was hypothesized that energy
lobalization has been growing and accelerating in recent decades.Fig. 8. US imports of oil and oil products.
Source of data: [21].
During the course of the article, an index was constructed to assess
the progress of energy globalization. The constructed index indi-
cates that energy globalization has indeed grown, but neither as
steeply nor as smoothly as expected expected, and without accel-
erating. On the other hand, it is still possible that in the longer term,
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here will be a trend toward steadily increasing energy globaliza-
ion with some ups and downs along the way.
It is also possible that energy globalization will abate and even
e reversed if a renewable or nuclear energy technology revolu-
ion takes place and results in an abrupt re-decentralization of
he global energy supply [51]. Unconventional oil and gas have
lready made a dent in international energy linkages by reducing US
nergy import dependency [32,p. 55]. Such developments provide
upport for Clark’s [12] critique of globalization conceptualized as
n inexorable, unidirectional, technologically determined process,
hile introducing a rather different force of fragmentation from
hat envisaged by Clark, who focused on nationalism.
However, as mentioned in the introduction to the article, 1.4
illion people are not connected to an electricity grid, and 2.7 bil-
ion people rely on traditional biomass for cooking [34,p. 1] [37,p.
53]. As these people strive to gain access to modern energy, the
ong-term trend toward energy globalization may  easily continue
nabated.
Energy dependency was included as one of the sub-indicators
or the index, and energy globalization and energy dependency are
onnected. However, although a rise in energy dependency leads
o a rise in energy globalization as measured by the index, a rise in
nergy globalization does not necessarily lead to a rise in energy
ependency—if energy dependency is conceptualized as vulnera-
ility (on the distinction between energy security and vulnerability,
ee [14,p. 211]. When energy globalization is due to diversiﬁcation
f suppliers and/or consumers, it actually leads to lower vulnera-
ility.
In addition to the spatial or horizontal energy globalization
xamined in this article, there are also changing vertical linkages
etween different energy types in individual locations. For exam-
le, the growth in natural gas vehicles (NGVs) creates interaction
etween the markets for natural gas and oil, and the generation of
lectricity from coal, natural gas, nuclear power, hydropower and
mall-scale renewable energy sources for the same grid bring all of
hese energy types into contact with each other. These interactions
hain together the geographical spans of different energy types.
or example, in the EU electricity market(s), American coal com-
etes against Russian natural gas, and both of these are affected
y other factors in the United States (for example, shale gas, see
35] and Russia (for example, subsidies for natural gas, see [18,52].
his interface between geographical extent of energy linkages and
hanging interlinkages between different energy types is not cap-
ured by the index in this article. The reason for this is that there
re no data that could obtain a systematic handle on the interaction
etween all different energy types.
The methodological issues that arose in connection with the
esign of the index also serve to highlight how many basic
uestions remain unaddressed in much of the globalization
iterature—in particular, how to interpret the impact of changing
tate boundaries due to state dissolution or uniﬁcation and whether
lobalization should be thought of in relation to the planet or per
apita. These issues go to the very heart of the concept of globaliza-
ion, and it is surprising that they are not more widely discussed in
he literature. Further exploration of them would help clarify what
lobalization is, how it is evolving, and how it can be analyzed.
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